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7KH(DVWHUQ2ULJLQVRIWKH5LVHRIWKH:HVWDQGWKH³5HWXUQ´RI$VLD 
 
John M. Hobson 
University of Sheffield 
Department of Politics 
 
 
Introduction 
It is a Eurocentric commonplace within International Relations and various related 
disciplines that the place of Asia in world history, past and present, is considered to be 
below that of Europe and the West. That is, the West is generally thought to be the prime 
mover of the international system and of progressive economic development in the last 
500 years while the East is demoted to the status of passive recipient of Western actions ± 
whether these take the form of either Western largesse or exploitation. With current 
LQWHUHVWLQ$VLDLQJHQHUDODQGRIWKH³ULVH´RI&KLQDLQSDUWLFXODUVXUJLQJZLWKLQWKH
Western Academy, it seems an opportune moment to re-evaluate this Eurocentric 
conception. In this article I shall effectively invert the standard Eurocentric conception of 
globalization and world history by arguing that this phenomenon preceded the rise of the 
West and that the West emerged in the latter part of the second millennium in significant, 
though by no means complete, part as a function of Eastern-led globalization (or 
Orientalization). Moreover, one of the most significant aspects of the Eastern-led global 
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HFRQRP\LVWKDWLWZDVDORQJLWVVLQHZVWKDW(DVWHUQµUHVRXUFHSRUWIROLRV¶LGHDV
technologies and institutions) diffused across to enable the rise of the West.  
While significant parts of Asia played key roles in reproducing the nascent global 
economy that emerged after 1450/1492, China was the leading economy. After about 
1850 Europe began to eclipse the economic power of China and India and clearly the 
:HVWEHFDPHWKHGRPLQDQWUHJLRQRIWKHZRUOGWKHUHDIWHU+RZHYHUVLQFH&KLQD¶V
development has been such that by the early 2000s it had caught the headlines across the 
world. Indeed only very recently we learned that Chinese national income has eclipsed 
WKDWRI$PHULFD¶VZKHQPHDVXUHGDFFRUGLQJWRSXUFKDVLQJSRZHUSDULW\1HYHUWKHOHVV
ZKLOHPDQ\:HVWHUQVFKRODUVDVVXPHWKDW&KLQD¶VULVHFDQEHWUDFHd back to 1978 ± the 
QRWLRQRI³-as-year-]HUR´ ± I will suggest WKDW&KLQD¶VULVHVWHms back almost exactly 
1000 years to 960, when the Sung Dynasty emerged. By the end of the eleventh century 
China was the leading economy in the world and after about 1450 it was the key player in 
the nascent global economy. It remained at the centre until about 1830 and while it 
clearly took a backseat to the West for the ensuing 150-odd years, nevertheless today it is 
QRWVRPXFK³ULVLQJ´EXW³UHWXUQLQJ´ to the centre of the global economy. It is this long 
historical process of development that yields the QRWLRQRI&KLQD¶V³UHWXUQ´WRGD\UDWKHU
WKDQLWVFRQWHPSRUDU\³ULVH´WKDWWKLVDUWLFOHLVSDUWLFXODUO\FRQFHUQHG with. 
The article proceeds through four sections. I begin by outlining the Eurocentric 
³ELJEDQJWKHRU\´WKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHGRPLQDQWWURSHIound in Eurocentric world history 
and Eurocentric theories of globalization. The second section considers the Afro-Eurasian 
process of regionalization that wove together these continents while the third section 
discusses the period of Eastern-led early globalization. Finally, the long fourth section 
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reveals some of the many non-Western influences that enabled the rise of the West, 
which comprise: the Renaissance and Scientific Revolution, the European Age of 
Discovery, the Enlightenment and the British industrial and agricultural revolutions. That 
said, though, it would be wrong to assume that the lines of impact and transmission went 
only from East to West. Certainly after the seventeenth century the West impacted the 
East; and this two-way interaction process has been no better captured than in C.A. 
%D\O\¶VPDJLVWHULDOYROXPHThe Birth of the Modern World 1780±1914 [3]. My point 
here is not to dismiss Western influences on the world but to hone in on the manifold 
Eastern influences which have been marginalised within Eurocentric world history.  
 
The Eurocentric ³%LJ%DQJ´conceptual narrative of Europe and Asia 
$VLDDQG(XURSHDUHJHQHUDOO\VLWXDWHGZLWKLQZKDW,FDOOWKH(XURFHQWULF³ELJEDQJ
WKHRU\´RIJOREDOL]DWLRQZRUOGKLVWRU\DQGRIWKHJOREDOSROLWLFal economy/world politics. 
This comprises a two-step narrative wherein the first step Europe rises to the top of the 
world economic hierarchy and then, in the second step, exports its civilizational attributes 
so as to remake the world, so far as it can, in the image of the West. Of course my reader 
might well think that such a claim is entirely unproblematic. So to be more specific: the 
first step of the big bang theory holds that by, or during, the 16th century Europe had risen 
to the top of the world material power hierarchy entirely of its own accord. Here it is 
assumed that the West is a self-made civilization which developed through the 
(XURFHQWULF³logic of immanence´LQVRIDUDV(XURSHFRQWDLQHGZLWKLQLWVHOIWKHVHHGVRI
its own rise such that it had all the necessary social energies/ingenuities and above all, the 
rational institutions and culture, to be able to self-generate [13, 14]. And this in turn rests 
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on the assumption that Europe, and later the United States, are GHHPHGµH[FHSWLRQDO¶,Q
the process the story of the rise of the West is related in terms of an endogenous, 
evolutionary, unfolding intra-(XURSHDQSURFHVVZKHUHLQ(XURSH¶VGHYHORSPHQWLQWR
modernity was inscribed within its social structure such that its rise to the top was but an 
(a)historical fait accompli; that it was foretold, pre-ordained or written. 
 No less critically for many, though not all, Eurocentrics, such a developmental 
journey is deemed to have been absent in the East, wherein the East is constructed as the 
:HVW¶Vinferior opposite Other and is denied the progressive ability to self-generate. Thus 
WKH(DVWLVVDLGWREHJRYHUQHGE\³LUUDWLRQDO´UHJUHVVLYHLQVWLWXWLRQV± eg., Oriental 
despotic states rather than Western liberal states, mystical other-worldly religions rather 
than rational Protestantism, collectivist rather than individualist social structures, 
superstitious mentalities rather than scientific ones, and so on. All of which culminates in 
the point that for many, though not all, Eurocentric scholars, because the East is deemed 
to be incapable of self-development so it was incumbent upon the West to engage in an 
LPSHULDORUJOREDOFLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQLQRUGHUWRµNLFN-VWDUW¶WKH(DVWVRWKDWLWFRXOGMRLQ
the Western developmental track that would eventually deliver it to the terminus of 
Western-based capitalist civilization (or communism for Marxism).  
At this point, the second-step of the Eurocentric big bang theory cuts in. For 
having risen to the top the West expands outwards to remake the world in its own image.  
Or, to complete the metaphor: the big bang of capitalist development exploded 
spontaneously in Europe in the 16th century and thereafter Western civilization diffused 
outwards to remake the earthly universe in its own image. After 1492 European 
civilization is thought to have diffused through trading-post empires in Asia and formal 
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imperialism in the Americas and, later on, through formal imperialism in large parts of 
Asia and Africa as well as through informal imperialism in the Middle East. In the 
Eurocentric vision the period covering 1492 to 1945 is in effect thought of as one that is 
marked by Western-OHG³SURWR-JOREDOL]DWLRQ´DQGLVQDUUDWHGLQWHUPVRID:HVWHUQUHOD\
race wherein the baton of global power was passed from the Spanish and Portuguese to 
the Dutch, who then passed it to the British and French, while the final leg of global 
economic power and of globalization was run in record time by the American anchor 
man. The essential task performed by these Western runners was to smash down the 
REVWUXFWLYHZDOOVRU³UHJUHVVLYHEDUULHUV´ that allegedly divided a barbaric and savage 
East from the civilized West.  
 In this article I advance an alternative non-Eurocentric vision which, in effect, 
inverts the standard Eurocentric chronology and explanation. This comprises three key 
inversions: 
 
1) Europe was not the early but a late-developer and that East Asia, the Middle East 
and North Africa as well as India were the original earlier developers. Consistent 
with late development theory I argue that the West was only able to develop and 
break through to modernity because it borrowed, assimilated and appropriated the 
more advanced Eastern technologies, ideas and institutions.   
2) Eurocentric world history assumes that the rise of the West came first and then 
globalization followed. Instead I shall argue that Europe modernized in the first 
global era (1492±c.1830) that was dominated by Orientalization or Easternization. 
That is, Orientalization enabled the rise of the West.  
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3) Standard Eurocentric world history presumes that Europe dominated world 
progress between 1500 and the present only to be challenged by the rise of East 
Asia since the 1960s/1970s. That is, the mainstream of world economic history in 
the last half millennium has been Western-led. But I shall argue that between 650 
and 1830 significant parts of the East ± again, the Middle East and North Africa, 
China and India ± were the key global economic players and that while the West 
came to dominate the global economy between 1830 and 2010 the mainstream is 
now shifting back to China, East Asia (and India). Thus the mainstream of global 
progress has been Eastern for the majority of the last 1500 years and with a brief, 
albeit hugely significant, Western interlude, is now returning to the East whence it 
FDPH7KXV,SUHIHUWRWDONDERXWWKH³UHWXUQ´RI$VLDUDWKHUWKDQWKH³ULVH´RI
Asia. 
 
 
Afro-Eurasian Regionalization/Eastern-led Proto-Globalization 
Here I break the long period of c.650±1800 into two phases beginning with the Afro-
Eurasian regionalization/proto-globalization between 500±1450/1492. While Eurocentric 
history proclaims that the birth of proto-globalization occurred during the European Age 
of Discovery, this occludes what might be called the Eastern Age of Discovery that 
occurred between about c.500 and c.750 [13].  
While numerous Eastern traders were important, including Jews, Armenians, 
Javanese, Africans, Indians and Chinese, nevertheless, the key pioneering role was 
performed by the West Asian Muslims. The Muslims sought initially to unify West Asia 
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through Islam and trade, before they spread outwards to Africa in the south, India, 
6RXWKHDVW$VLDDQG&KLQDLQWKHHDVWDQG(XURSHRU³&KULVWHQGRP´LQWKHZHVW7KHLU
economic reach was extraordinary for the time such that West Asia in effect constituted 
the pivot of Afro-Eurasian trade with Mecca lying at the centre. As early as the ninth 
century one long, continuous line of transcontinental trade had been established by 
Islamic merchants, spanning the space between China, Europe and Africa [1, 16]. Not 
MXVWWUDGHEXW,VODP¶VSRZHUWRRVSUHDGUDSLGO\DIWHUWKHVHYHQWKFHQWXU\ZLWKWKH
0HGLWHUUDQHDQEHFRPLQJLQHIIHFWD0XVOLP/DNHDQG³:HVWHUQ(XURSH´DSURPRQWRU\
within the Afro-Eurasian regional economy.  
Janet Abu-Lughod has provided a detailed picture of this trans-continental trading 
network (although she dates it to the 12th and 13th centuries, whereas I see them 
developing earlier). The Islamic Ummayads, Abbasids and North African Fatimids were 
vital in uniting various arteries of long-distance trade known in antiquity between the 
Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. These refer principally to the Northern, Middle and 
Southern routes [1], though the latter two routes were key. The middle route began on the 
Mediterranean coast of Syria/Palestine, crossed over to Baghdad and then forked either 
along the land route to the east or southward to the Persian Gulf, which then linked up 
with the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and beyond into the China seas. The land route 
tracked eastward across Persia to Transoxiana, before bifurcating into a southern link to 
India and an eastern link to China. The Southern route linked the Alexandria-Cairo-Red 
Sea complex with the Arabian Sea and then the Indian Ocean and beyond. The fall of 
Baghdad in 1258 saw the capital of the Islamic world shift to Al-Qahirah ± later 
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Europeanised to Cairo ± which then became the pivotal centre of Afro-Eurasian trade 
(though this latter process began during the Fatimid era back in the tenth century).  
 The lucrative Eastern trade diffused across these commercial routes into Africa 
and Europe (principally via Italy) at the far western end of this regional system, which in 
turn enabled the Venetians to perform their intermediary role between Europe and the 
East. Then, with the Fall of Acre in 1291, which marked the end of the Crusades, the 
Venetians came to rely on the southern route which was guarded over by the Egyptians. 
So pivotal was Egypt in this respect that Abu-/XJKRG>@GHFODUHGWKDW³>Z@KRHYHU
controlled the sea-route to Asia could set the terms of trade for a Europe now in retreat. 
From the thirteenth century and up to WKHVL[WHHQWKWKDWSRZHUZDV(J\SW´6WULNLQJO\
some 80 per cent of trade that came from the East in the period 1291±1517 was 
controlled by the Egyptians. And even after 1517 (the year that Egypt succumbed to the 
Ottoman Empire) Venice continued to survive through its links with Egypt. 
 Accordingly, we need to qualify the common claim that Venice and Genoa were 
pioneers of global trade. Rather, we might better understand them as intermediaries or 
even adaptors, whose success was dependent upon their ability to insert themselves into 
the interstices of the Afro-Asian-led trading system. And this is reinforced by the point 
that they entered the nascent global economy on the strict conditions that were imposed 
by the Egyptians and West Asian Muslims. 
 
Early Eastern-led Globalization, 1450/1492-c.1830 
In the general Eurocentric narrative of world history it is largely assumed that before 
1492 the world was segmentalized or sub-divided into autonomous and isolated regions, 
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such that it was only with the initiation of the European Age of Discovery that these walls 
were gradually broken down. This constituted, in effect, the age of primitive global 
accumulation which prepared the launching pad for the take off of thick globalization 
under the auspices of the United States after 1945. But in the light of the discussion thus 
far it becomes apparent that all that was really happening was that the Europeans were 
finally joining in a direct way the nascent global economy, the foundations of which had 
been laid by the numerous eastern traders following the Asian Age of Discovery around 
the sixth century. That is, 1492 and the rise of globalization or proto-globalization did not 
come out of nowhere but was preceded by the intensive integrationist tendency of Afro-
Eurasian regionalization. Moreover, it might be fairer to conclude that the Iberians in 
their travels to India discovered nothing that had not already been known to the many 
Eastern traders who had engaged it for some 800 years previously; hence they might be 
better labelled the European voyages of Re-Discovery. 
 It is at this point that we encounter one of the most profound paradoxes of world 
history. For it is a Eurocentric axiom that after 1434 the Chinese withdrew from 
international trade and retreated into an isolationist phase, thereby allegedly creating a 
vacuum into which the highly charged Iberians avidly poured to initiate the phase of 
primitive global accumulation [20, 25]. But the first paradox emerges in the point that 
after 1434 the Chinese in fact moved to the centre of the nascent global economy; and the 
second paradox emerges in the point that European trading connections with Afro-Asia 
intensified in this period in significant part as a function of the role played by the 
Muslims, Indians and, above alOWKH&KLQHVH+RZWKHQFDQZHXQGHUVWDQG&KLQD¶VPRYH
to the centre of the nascent global economy? 
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One significant moment lay in the conversion of the Chinese economy onto a 
silver standard in the mid-fifteenth century. For this created a huge demand for silver that 
IORRGHGLQDVDUHVXOWRI(XURSH¶VHQFRXQWHUZLWKWKH$PHULFDV%XWWKLVKXJHGHPDQG
was in turn a function of the strength of the Chinese economy, which had undergone a 
kind of industrial miracle in the 10th and 11th centuries [13]. The strength of the Chinese 
economy issued a large export drive. But because Chinese had no appetite for European 
JRRGVVRWKHRQO\ZD\WKDW(XURSH¶VVWUXFWXUDOWUDGHGHILFLWFRXOGEHILQDQFHGZDV
through exchanging Chinese goods for silver. Not surprisingly this issued a strong 
JUDYLWDWLRQDOSXOOIRUWKHZRUOG¶VVLOYHULQWR(DVWDQG6RXWK$VLD 
But it was not just the systemic European trade deficit with China that was 
LPSRUWDQWZKHQWU\LQJWRXQGHUVWDQG&KLQD¶VSODFHLQWKHHPHUJHQWJOREDOHFRQRP\$V
Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez [8] have argued, after 1492 there developed a global 
DUELWUDJHV\VWHPRUD³JOREDOVLOYHU-UHF\FOLQJSURFHVV´ZLWK&KLQDFRQVWLWXWLQJLWV
pivot. Because the Chinese economy was the strongest in the world right down to the 
nineteenth century [9, 13], that its monetary system was based on silver and that it 
enjoyed significant trade surpluses which were financed by silver meant that the price of 
silver relative to gold in China was about twice that of the equivalent figure in Europe 
(1:6 in China, 1:12 in Europe). This fuelled the global silver arbitrage system whereby 
American silver was shipped by the Europeans into China whereupon it was exchanged 
for gold. This was then shipped back to Europe where it was exchanged for twice the 
amount of gold before this was then shipped back to China where the process began 
anew. Profits were realized at each stage of the process, thereby fanning the development 
of the Chinese and European economies. Also of significance is that the various East 
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India Companies inserted themselves into this system and derived about 75 per cent of 
their profits from shipping the gold and silver across the world. This yields several 
conclusions: first, that China was a key player within this global trading system and 
second, that European economic success was a function of the various East India 
FRPSDQLHV¶DELOLW\WRSOXJWKHPVHOYHVLQWRWKLV&KLQHVHSRRl (or what Andre Gunder 
Frank [9@UHIHUVWRDVWKH³&KLQHVHVLOYHUVLQN´7KLVLVUHLQIRUFHGE\DWKLUGSRLQWWKDW 
the Europeans relied for much of the rest of their profits not by monopolizing Asian trade 
as Eurocentric world history presumes but by acting as intermediaries within the intra-
$VLDQWUDGLQJQHWZRUNVRUWKHµLQWHU-FRXQWU\WUDGH¶6RZKLOHWKH(XURSHDQV played a 
role in the emergent global economy it was secondary to that played by China as well as 
other major actors such as India and West Asia. 
The bigger point is that various Eastern agents played key roles in driving the 
global economy forward after the fifteenth century. Of course, this vision conflicts 
directly with the one that is constructed by Eurocentric world historians, which focuses 
on QRWMXVW(XURSH¶VRSHQLQJXSRI$VLDEXWDOVR%ULWDLQ¶VFHQWUDOUROHWKDWKLQJHGRQWKH
creation of the triangular trading system (usually referred to as the Atlantic system). This 
refers to the way in which Britain linked West Africa with the Americas and created one 
continuous trading system, wherein African slaves were purchased in West Africa, who 
were then shipped via the Middle Passage to the Americas where they were put to work 
in the mines and plantations, the products of which were then shipped back to Britain 
before the whole process began anew. While this was certainly a significant development 
so far as linking up the world was concerned nevertheless the key point is that much of 
the impetus to the Atlantic system was provided by the gravitational pull of the East ± 
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India and China in particular. For, as we have seen, a good proportion of the silver that 
was plundered by the Europeans in the Americas ± somewhere between a third [7] and 
two-thirds [9] ± wended its way across to China and India, either eastwards via the Cape 
Route and the West-Asian dominated overland and sea routes or westwards via the trade 
route that went from Chile to China via the Philippines on board the Spanish Manila 
galleons. It might even be the case that Indian and especially Chinese demand for this 
silver was crucial in maintaining the profitability of the American mines [9].  
Pulling all this together it can be concluded that both the Pacific and Indian Ocean 
economies, which were dominated by Asian merchants, provided a strong input into the 
reproduction of the Atlantic economy. And while this is not to say that the European role 
in the Atlantic system was unimportant it is, nevertheless, to say that the Pacific/Indian 
Ocean trading systems helped suck the Europeans into both these systems as well as 
VXVWDLQ(XURSH¶VUROHLQWKHAtlantic system. This is brought into further relief by the 
point that the Europeans before 1800 did not dominate the Asian trading system but in 
fact played a subordinate role, being dependent upon local Asian knowledge, Asian 
capital (much of which was provided by rich Indian Banians), and the goodwill of Asian 
rulers ± in addition to the point that the EICs derived their profits from inserting 
themselves into the Asian-led system [9, 13]. Indeed they even had no choice but to 
cooperate with the Asians in such matters as the sharing of trading ships.  
However, standard Eurocentric narratives deny that the period between 1450/1492 
DQGTXDOLILHGDV³JOREDO´SUHIHUULQJWRVHHLWDVDQHUDRISURWR-globalization 
wherein the Europeans broke down the walls EHKLQGZKLFK³EDUEDULF´DQG³VDYDJH´
societies hid from the world thereby preparing the ground for the future emergence of 
 13 
thick globalization. It is certainly true that the quantity of trade in this era was well below 
that of the post-1945 era. But trade was only one factor of relevance here. Most important 
RIDOOZDVWKHGLIIXVLRQRI³UHVRXUFHSRUWIROLRV´IURP(DVWWR:HVW$V,PHQWLRQHG
earlier, all the key developments that we associate with the rise of the West were 
significantly enabled by the borrowing or assimilation of Eastern resource portfolios. 
This is important to rethink the way that we traditionally conceive of the rise of the West. 
But at this stage of proceedings another key point emerges. For one of the key properties 
of globalization is that which David Held and his co-authors [12] describe as high 
³LPSDFWSURSHQVLW\´E\ZKLFKWKH\DUHUHIHUULQJWRWKHSRLQWWKDWJOREDOL]DWLRQRQO\
properly exists when it can be demonstrated that global flows can re-organize societies 
that are geographically very far apart. In the following section I shall argue that various 
global flows that went from East to West were so significant that they enabled a 
fundamental re-organization of Europe ± specifically enabling its transition from 
feudalism to capitalism ± thereby suggesting that the impact propensity of such flows was 
in fact sufficiently high to warrant the term globalization. Space precludes a full 
discussion here but to illustrate my claim I shall consider some of the influences that 
India, the Islamic Middle East and China imparted on the rise of the West.  
 
Indian, West Asian and Chinese influences on the rise of the West 
Before I chart some of the key non-Western influences on the rise of the West it is worth 
pausing for a moment to consider a key issue that addresses one of the enduring 
challenges to global-dialogical history ± notably the problem of proof concerning 
transmissions. For the response, often made by Eurocentrics, when confronted by the 
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claim that a certain idea/institution/technology came from outside Europe, is that it could 
have been an independent European invention, thereby rendering its non-European 
origins either irrelevant or simply coincidental. Often it is not possible to prove a 
particular transfer, with circumstantial evidHQFHRIWHQEHLQJWKHRQO\³SURRI´RIIHUHG
This is discussed by Arun Bala [2]. He agrees that it is insufficient simply to assert cross-
civilizational transfer in those cases where an idea that appeared in Europe was invented 
previously elsewhere. Nor is it sufficient to offer up circumstantial evidence. Instead he 
argues that we can reasonably infer transmission in those situations where a particular 
culture (say Europe) is interested in understanding an earlier invention in a non-Western 
civilization, and when the non-Western invention (ideational, institutional or 
technological) appears soon after that interest is displayed within Europe. Thus he asserts 
WKDW³>W@RFODLPWUDQVPLVVLRQZHPXVW«VKRZWKDWWKHQHZWKHPHGHYHORSHGVKRUWO\DIWHU
a corridor of communication opened between two cultures, and that the new idea was a 
GRPLQDQWWKHPHLQWKHLQIOXHQFLQJFXOWXUHEXWQRWLQWKH>UHFHLYLQJ@FXOWXUH´>@6RZLWK
this in mind I shall consider some of the key non-Western influences that enabled the rise 
of the West. 
 
Chinese, Indian and Islamic origins of the Renaissance and Scientific Revolution 
It is often held that the Italian Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution constituted key 
epistemic turning points insofar as they retracked Europe away from its old theological 
modus operandi and pointed it toward a more modern rational and scientific way of 
thinking. These twin epistemic revolutions are usually thought to FRQVWLWXWH³SXUH
(XURSHDQ´PRPHQWVLQVRIDUDVWKH\OHGWKH&DWKROLF&KULVWLDQVWRUHDFKEDFN to the 
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progressive, rational and scientific ideas that were developed in Ancient Greece. Put 
differently, Europe in effect regained its original progressive stance during the 15th to 17th 
centuries, casting the so-called dark ages that unfolded after the end of the Roman 
Empire to the periphery of European history.  
However, there is now a significant literature that re-casts these epistemic 
revolutions in an eastern light, wherein many of the key breakthroughs  
found their invention earlier in India, China but most especially in Islamic West Asia and 
the Levant [2, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26]. Islamic breakthroughs in 
mathematics, many of which were reliant upon previous Indian breakthroughs (to be 
discussed below), especially that of algebra aQGWULJRQRPHWU\ZHUHSLYRWDO³$OJHEUD´
was derived from the title of one of al-.KZƗUL]PƯ¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOWH[WVIROORZLQJ5REHUW
RI.HWWRQ¶VWUDQVODWLRQLQ0RUHRYHUE\WKHHDUO\WHQWKFHQWXU\CE all six of the 
classical trigonometric functions had been established by Muslim mathematicians. 
Developments in public health, hygiene and medicine were also notable. Al-5Ɨ]Ư¶V
medical works were translated and reprinted in Europe some forty times between 1498 
DQG,EQ6ƯQƗ¶V$YLFHQQD¶VCanon of Medicine became a founding text in 
European medical schools between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. The Muslims 
developed numerous medicines and anaesthetics and pioneered the study of anatomy. 
And the Egyptian physician, Ibn al-Nafis (d. 1288), whose work on the human body, 
which contradicted the traditional position of the Greek physician, Galen, fully pre-
empted the work of William Harvey by some 350 years.  
The Muslims were also expert cartographers, astrologers and astronomers such 
that many of these ideas were drawn upon by the Europeans (see below). Interestingly, 
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Ibn al-6KƗWLU¶VPDWKHPDWLFDOPRGHOVERUHDYHU\FORVHUHVHPEODQFHWRWKRVHXVHGE\
&RSHUQLFXVVRPH\HDUVODWHU1RHO6ZHUGORZKDVVXJJHVWHGWKDWLW³VHHPVWRR
remarkable a series of coincidences to admit the possibility of independent discovery [on 
WKHSDUWRI&RSHUQLFXV@´FLWHGLQ>@%DODDUJXHVthat Copernicus inherited his 
trigonometric methods from Indian mathematical astronomers and took various insights 
from Muslim astronomers. Drawing on Joseph [17] he singles out three key Indian 
mathematicians in the period covering the period from 476 through to 1185: Aryabhata, 
Brahmagupta and Bhaskara II [2]. Their pioneering developments in mathematics 
comprised vital breakthroughs in the absence of which the Europeans would not have 
been equipped sufficiently with the requisite knowledge to undertake the Renaissance 
and Scientific Revolution. He emphasizes too that Indian mathematical development did 
not dry up after the 14th century, as is commonly assumed. Here, he and others [17, 24] 
reveal the vital role played by the Kerala school between the 14th and 16th centuries with 
the breakthrough in developing thH³LQILQLWHVHULHV´being crucial. Again, this period was 
marked by three key thinkers ± Madhava, Nilakantha, and Jyesthadeva. 
One of the defining aspects of the Renaissance is the concept of perspectivism; 
something which is said to have originated within Italian art. But perspectivism reaches 
back to the prior work of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen, 965±1030 CE) and his optical 
revolution that emerged at the turn of the second millennium CE. His unique move was to 
UHSODFHWKHPHGLHYDO³H[WUDPLVVLRQWKHRU\´ZLWKKLV³LQWURPLVVLRQWKHRU\´+HDOVRGUHZ
on many of the mathematical breakthroughs that were pioneered by other Muslim 
thinkers VXFKDV,EQ6ƯQƗ$YLFHQQDDQGDO-Biruni. The upshot was that it entrenched 
mathematical realism (which went beyond the stage reached by the ancient Greeks). 
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Moreover, the new optical theory led to a shift in the perceptual sensibilities of the 
Europeans, EULQJLQJWROLJKW³SHUVSHFWLYLVP´ZKHUHLQWKHDUWLVWUHSUHVHQWHGREMHFWVDV
they appeared to the observer. Given that mathematical perspectivism was central to the 
Renaissance, al-+D\WKDP¶VSRVLWLRQZLWKLQWKLVHSLVWHPLFUHYROXWLRQZDVSUREDEO\KLJKO\
significant [2]. 
Last, but certainly not least, the Muslims (especially the Mutazilites) propagated 
the idea that man was a free and rational agent ± supposedly one of the leitmotifs of 
modern European thinking. Such an idea emerged not long after the Prophet 
0RKDPPHG¶VGHDWKVLJQLI\LQJDPRYHWRZDUGVµUDWLRQDO,VODPLFWKHRORJ\¶VRWKDWthe 
Prophet 0RKDPPHG¶VWHDFKLQJVFRXOGQRWEHGLVWRUWHGE\VXEVHTXHQWSROLWLFDO
authorities). Known as Ijtihad, it involved the exercise of independent judgement and, 
above all, the notion that God could only be comprehended through unaided and 
individualistic human reason. This idea was incorporated into the works of scholars such 
as al-.LQGƯ±873), al-5Ɨ]Ư±925), al-)ƗUƗEL±,EQ6ƯQƗ±1037), al-
=DKUƗZƯ936±1013) and Ibn Rushd (1126± 98). Moreover, Ibn Rushd called for a 
separation of religious and scientific truth. It is also noteworthy here that while a key 
leitmotif of the Scientific Revolution was the idea of the experimental method this was, 
nevertheless, first expounded by the Muslims (not the Greeks).  
The question now becomes: were there plausible transmission paths that could 
enable this knowledge diffusion or was it all just a case of coincidental and independent 
inventions in the West and East? Bala points out that there was a clear transmission path 
that reached from India to Europe at the very time that the Europeans were seeking to 
develop mathematical understanding [2]. Given that when Vasco da Gama landed in 
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India he arrived in Calicut, which comprised the centre of mathematical developments 
undertaken by the Kerala school, so he would have had plenty of opportunity to 
encounter this school. Significantly, -\HVWKDGHYD¶VWH[WYuktibhasa (1550), was 
circulated among the Portuguese missionary schools in India. No less importantly, it was 
very shortly after this that the Europeans began to approach problems connected to the 
infinite series using the methods laid out in the Yuktibhasa. Bala also singles out other 
very close links, thereby consolidating his claim concerning the Indian contribution to 
(XURSH¶VHSLVWHPLFUHYROXWLRQWKRXJKWKLVVKRXOGQRWREVFXUHWKH,VODPLFDQG&KLQHVH
contributions which he also discusses). But, in any case, much of the Islamic 
mathematical knowledge was informed in various ways by the Indian breakthroughs.  
What then of the transmission paths connecting Islamic West Asia/North Africa 
to Italy and, moreover, did the absorption of Islamic ideas occur at the time when the 
Europeans were exhibiting signs of interest in such knowledge? First, increasingly after 
about 900, Europeans began translating Islamic texts into Latin. Islamic scholarship 
developed not only in West Asia but also in Spain, where it was proactively encouraged 
by the second Ummayad Caliph al-Hakkam II (961±76). The fall of Spanish Toledo was 
vital for it was from its vast library where the Europeans accessed many of the relevant 
books, which were then rapidly translated into Latin. Learning from Islam was actively 
continued by the Spanish King, Alfonso X (1252±1284), though largely through Jewish 
intermediaries (given the political difficulty of employing Muslims during the Crusades). 
Much the same was true of the situation in Portugal. Second, Islamic ideas also entered 
Europe via the Ottoman Empire, which was heavily embroiled in Eastern Europe, 
especially in the Balkans. Third, Islamic ideas also entered Venice through the trade route 
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that went from West Asia and North Africa as well as from Islamic Sicily after 902 
(something that was reflected in the Arabic influence on the School of Salerno after 
1050). In short, then, there were indeed sufficient and abundant transmission paths. 
 
Chinese and Islamic origins of the (XURSHDQ³$JHRI'LVFRYHU\´ 
In Eurocentric world history the Renaissance is thought to have triggered the European 
Age of Discovery as the highly curious Iberians, furnished with all this new and pure 
³(XURSHDQ´NQRZOHGJH, sought to go out and explore what is thought to have been a 
backward Asian world that was mired in stagnation and irrational institutions. But it is 
highly possible that the Voyages were enabled in the first place by the transmission of 
Eastern knowledge and technologies, much of which emanated from West Asia and 
China. It is highly likely that it was the Muslims who had invented the lateen sail which 
enabled them to sail into a headwind. For European oceanic sailing relied on the lateen 
sail; something which proved to be vital for the Portuguese as they explored the western 
coastline of Africa given that strong headwinds blew up in just south of Cape Bojador. 
Because the lateen sail led to a zigzagging (triangular) path so the use of geometry and 
trigonometry was required in order to calculate the linear distance path travelled. As I 
have argued already, these mathematical procedures were passed on to the Iberians 
primarily by the Muslims. And because the strong tides south of Cape Bojador off the 
west coast of Africa could beach a ship, so knowledge of lunar cycles were required 
(given that the moon governs the tides). These too were passed on by the Muslims via the 
Jewish cartographer Jacob ben Abraham Cresques, who resided in Portugal. Added to 
this was knowledge of solar calendars, more accurate navigational charts, latitude and 
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longitude tables, as well as the astrolabe and quadrant [13, 27], all of which originated in 
West Asia. Notable too is that the square hull and stern-post rudder (which was a crucial 
nautical technology that enabled oceanic sailing) was invented in China around 400 CE. 
Moreover, the triple mast system and the compass also emanated from China and the 
latter was deployed in Chinese ships by 1090 with this invention reaching Italy around 
1185. 
The European voyages were, however, unique in one sense: that the European 
ships were armed with cannon. For prior to the European incursion into the Indian Ocean 
Asian trade was a largely peaceful affair. But there is evidence to suggest that the cannon 
was invented by the Chinese around 1290 (where it was known as thH³HUXSWRU´7KLVLV
significant because the first European cannon is dated to 1326 in Florence and 1327 in 
England (the latter is illustrated in the manuscript of Walter de Millemete) [15]. 
Crucially, the cannon presupposes a significant amount of developmental time prior to its 
final invention; something which is clearly absent in the extant discussions of the 
invention of the first European cannon. But such a line of prior development is clear in 
the Chinese context (covering the period from c.800±1290 stemming back over some five 
centuries).  
Ascertaining the transmission of the cannon to Europe is, however, based only on 
circumstantial evidence. Joseph Needham and his colleagues [22] suggest that this could 
have been achieved either by the Italian merchants who resided in Tabriz, or by the 
European friars who sojourned in China in the 13th century, or by the various Muslims 
who were employed in the Chinese military service after 1260. Certainly there was 
enough contact between Europe and China to enable the transmission of the idea of the 
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cannon, perhaps through pictorial representations and/or the actual information 
concerning its construction. While these claims are merely speculative it is obvious that 
the cannon cannot simply come out of nowhere. Claims for an independent European 
invention are problematic, though not simply because the earliest extant cannon is dated 
almost forty years after the invention of the Chinese Eruptor. For as noted above, the clue 
here is that no expert has revealed the evidence for the necessary European developments 
that must have preceded the first European cannon of 1326/7. Without these the diffusion 
of Chinese knowledge of the cannon provides a plausible answer.  
Of course the cannon presupposes the use of gunpowder. Eurocentric scholars 
often attribute the discovery of gunpowder to the European scientist Roger Bacon in 
1267. But the recipe for gunpowder stems back to China in c.850 and it was publicly 
available in print form in 1044. 1HHGKDPDOVRQRWHVWKDWLQ%DFRQ¶VSXEOLVKHGVWDWHPHQW
on gunpowder it seems clear that he was describing Chinese firecrackers [22]. It is 
possible that Bacon had gained access to the already published Chinese recipe for 
gunpowder. How could this knowledge have been transmitted across from China to the 
West? Paul Cressey [6] and Arnold Pacey [23] single out William of Rubrick (a personal 
IULHQGRI%DFRQ¶VZKRUHWXUQHGIURP&KLQDLQ7KRXJKKHFRXOGYHU\ZHOOhave 
brought back the information there was a series of Europeans (mainly friars) who 
travelled to China and back ever since 1245, any one of whom could have relayed the 
recipe [22].  
 
Chinese origins of the Enlightenment? 
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Turning to the post-1700 era of European history the next key developments were the 
Enlightenment and the British agricultural/industrial revolutions. It is a staple of Western 
text-books that the Enlightenment was a vital European cultural/epistemic innovation that 
ushered in the modern industrial period. But this obscures the point that between 1700±
c.1780, much of Europe drew heavily from many aspects of Chinese civilization, 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHLGHDRI³UDWLRQDOLW\´$QGVXFKLGHDVZHUHUHDGLO\DYDLODEOHJLYHQWKDW
there was a wealth of Chinese texts and pamphlets that flooded into Europe throughout 
much of the 18th century, many of which were brought back by the Jesuits [18].  
In the Anglo-Saxon canon the central European political economist was the 
Scotsman, Adam Smith. But while Anglo-Saxons celebrate Smith as the first political 
economist nevertheless, as is well-known among political economists, behind Smith lay 
François Quesnay, the French physiocrat. But less well-known is that behind Quesnay lay 
Confucius. So profound was the Confucian element in his thinking that Quesnay was 
IUHTXHQWO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³(XURSHDQ&RQIXFLXV´DWWKHWLPH$QGLWZDVLQIDFW
Quesnay rather than Smith, who was the first European to critique the ideas of 
PHUFDQWLOLVP7KHWHUP³SK\VLRFUDF\´PHDQVWKH³UXOHRIQDWXUH´7KLVZDVLPSRUWDQW
insofar as it located agriculture as a vital source of wealth (which later informed the idea 
of the British agricultural revolution). Critically, though, Quesnay argued that agriculture 
could only be fully exploited when producers were set free from the arbitrary 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVRIWKHVWDWH)RURQO\WKHQFRXOGWKH³QDWXUDOODZV´RIWKHPDUNHWFXWLQDV
the Chinese had long realized). 4XHVQD\¶VGHEWWR&KLQHVHFRQFHSWLRQVRISROLWLFDO
economy was found in many ideas, the most important being that of wu-wei ± which is 
translated into French as laissez-faire. Indeed as early as about 300 CE Kuo Hsiang 
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described wu-wei DVWKDWZKLFKOHWV³HYHU\WKLQJEHDOORZHGWRGRZKDWLWQDWXUDOO\GRHV
so that its nature will be saWLVILHG´DOWKRXJKLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWSUH-dates 
the start of the Common Era).  
The upshot of all this is not to say that the European Enlightenment was the pure 
product of Chinese ideas, for clearly there were some Enlightenment thinkers who 
rejected China as a model for Europe ± most notably Montesquieu and Fénelon. But it 
would be remiss to entirely ignore some kind of Chinese input in this major epistemic 
turning point of Western civilization.  
 
Chinese origins of the British agricultural revolution? 
Turning now to the British agricultural revolution it is fair to say that the key inventions 
FRPSULVHGWKHLURQPRXOGERDUGSORXJK-HWKUR7XOO¶VVHHGGULOODQGKRUVH-drawn hoe, the 
horse-powered threshing machine and the rotary winnowing machine, as well as 
breakthroughs in crop rotations. But all of these found precedent in sixth-century China. 
Taking each in turn it is notable that the iron mouldboard plough was first invented in 
China before the sixth century. It is curious that this was not copied before the eighteenth 
century given that the European medieval plough was so inefficient and that knowledge 
of this Chinese technology could have been relayed back in the thirteenth century. 
Nevertheless, what we do know is that in 1730 the Rotherham plough made its 
appearance in England and that this plough was borrowed from the Dutch (who termed it 
WKH³EDVWDUGSORXJK´%XWZHUHWKH'XWFKWKHRULJLQDOLQYHQWRUVRIWKHEDVWDUGSORXJK" 
It might be thought that the Rotherham and bastard ploughs were invented 
independently of the Chinese curved iron mouldboard plough. But Francesca Bray has 
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dismissed this possibility on the grounds that the new European ploughs far too closely 
resembled the much earlier Chinese invention. Indeed, Chinese iron mouldboard ploughs 
perfectly pre-empted the model that was described as late as 1784 by the European, 
James Small (who is usually credited as the pioneer of the plough). Moreover, the sudden 
emergence of the new European ploughs, which were so radically different to those that 
had been used for about a millennium, suggests that this could not have been mere 
coincidence. In any case, it is clear that the Dutch (who had resided in East Asia in the 
seventeenth century) had brought back the actual Chinese model and created the bastard 
plough [5].  
 The rotary winnowing machine was a major breakthrough in that it separated out 
the husks and stalks of the grain after the harvest. But it was long preceded by the 
Chinese rotary winnowing machine which stems back to the second century BCE [5]. 
Once again there is evidence that it was brought over from China, having been brought to 
France by the Jesuits in the 1720s and the Netherlands at the hands of Dutch sailors 
between 1700 and 1720. Additionally, various models were brought back to Sweden, 
where they were adapted by Swedish scientists such as Jonas Norberg. Interestingly, 
1RUEHUJRSHQO\DQQRXQFHGWKDWµ,JRWWKHLQLWLDOLGHD«IURPWKUHHVHSDUDWHPRGels 
EURXJKWKHUHIURP&KLQD¶>].  
 Prior to the deployment of the seed-drill, seeds were laboriously planted by hand, 
which was a highly inefficient business given that so much of the crop was lost since 
much of the sown-seed ended up with a clumping of the plants that then had to compete 
for light, moisture and nutrients. This contrasted with the Chinese multi-tube seed drill 
first invented in the third century BCE., which had enabled the development of a highly 
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efficient agricultural system [28]. Europe very belatedly caught up with China once 
Jethro Tull had apparently discovered the seed-drill. This device sowed the seed in 
regular rows and at a specific depth while the hoeing device was responsible for keeping 
the weeds down and ventilating the soil.  
Tracing the diffusion of this invention from China is not easy. Here we come 
across one of the dilemmas of the diffusion process for what diffused was not the model 
EXWWKHLGHDJLYHQWKDW7XOO¶VPRGHOZDVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWLQYDULRXVDVSHFWVWRWKH&KLQHVH
models. But it is highly likely that the idea of the drill was transmitted through the 
diffusion of books and manuals on this device that were readily available at that time. For 
example, in his book, The History of the Great and Renowned Monarchy of China 
(1655), Alvarez Semedo tells us that: 
 
As I passed by Honum [Honam], I saw one plowing with a plow of 3 
irons, or plough-sheares, so that at one bout he made 3 furrowes; and 
because the ground was good for the seed which we here call Feazols or 
Kidney-beanes; this seed was put, as it were, in a bushel, or square dish 
fastened upon the upper part of the plough, in such manner, that with the 
motion thereof the Beanes were gently scattered upon the earth as some 
falleth upon a Milstone, at the moving of the Mill-hopper; so at the same 
time the land is plowed and sown with hopes of a future crop (Semedo 
cited in [19]). 
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,WLVVWULNLQJWRQRWHWKDW7XOO¶VEDVLFSULQFLSOHVRIWKHVHHGGULOORXWOLQHGLQKLVERRN
Horse-Hoeing Husbandry (1733), were a near word-for-word reproduction of those laid 
out in the original Chinese manuals, which dated back to the third century BCE [5]. 
,QGHHG%UD\FODLPVWKDW7XOO¶VV\VWHPVRFORVHO\UHVHPEOHVµWKHIDUPLQJSUDFWLFHRI
Northern China that one is tempted to assume that Tull borrowed the system lock, stock 
DQGEDUUHOIURP&KLQD¶>]. Moreover, Bray also points out:  
 
One might argue that the European seed-drill was a logical development 
from earlier [European] horticultural techniques such as setting, yet it 
cannot be fortuitous that European inventors suddenly started working on 
machines to sow several rows of corn simultaneously in straight lines, just 
like the Chinese machines, precisely at the period when information about 
Chinese agriculture was becoming freely available [5]. 
 
Last, but not least, there is the issue of crop rotations, which are largely associated 
ZLWK7XUQLS7RZQVKHQG¶VLQQRYDWLRQV7KHQHZFURS-rotation systems, which were 
heralded by the British as one of the crucial agricultural breakthroughs, were fully pre-
empted by the Chinese. Strikingly, the Chinese had developed many such systems as 
early as the sixth-century, all of which were reported in the Chhi Min Yao Shu [5]. Once 
again, it is likely that this information, which was contained in various Chinese manuals 
that entered Europe after the mid-seventeenth century, could have directly influenced 
Townshend, particularly as that it was round about this time that the British were 
interested in developing agriculture. 
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Indian and Chinese origins of the British industrial revolution  
Building on the original insighWRI0DUVKDOO+RGJVRQ¶VHSLFZRUN>@D similar story 
can be told of the British industrial revolution. Thus while British economic historians 
celebrate James Watt for his skills in inventing the steam-engine, it is possible that he 
owed some kind of a debt to the Chinese. The essentials of the steam-engine go back to 
:DQJ&KrQ¶VTreatise on Agriculture (1313) that in turn reach back to the Chinese 
invention of the water-powered bellows (31 CE). While it is usually acknowledged that 
:DWW¶VHQJLQHVWHPVEDFNWR:LONLQVRQ¶VQHYHUWKHOHVVLWLVQRWXVXDOO\DFNQRZOHGJHG
WKDWWKHODWWHU¶VHQJLQHVKDUHGPDQ\VLPLODULWLHVZLWK:DQJ¶V0RUHRYHUWKH&KLQHVH
box-bellows was a double-acting force and suction pump, which at each stroke expelled 
the air from one side of the piston while drawing in an equal amount of air on the other 
VLGH7KLVVKDUHGD³FORVHIRUPDOUHVHPEODQFH´WR:DWW¶VHQJLQHDQGE\WKHODWH-
seventeenth century, the Chinese had developed a steam turbine [21]. Moreover, Chinese 
breakthroughs in gun manufacturing were significant, enabling the later invention of the 
steam-engine (given that the cannon or gun is in effect a one-cylinder combustion 
engine). And a further link of note is that one of the major challenges confronting James 
Watt was the need to bore an airtight cylinder and that he had turned to John Wilkinson 
for help in this matter, given that Wilkinson owned a boring mill that was designed for 
cannon production. 
Iron (and later steel) production formed, alongside cotton manufacturing, the twin 
pillar of the British industrial revolution. However, we know that the Chinese and the 
Indians were developing such industries well before the British. Given this, it is not 
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surprising that British producers (including Benjamin Huntsman of Sheffield) studied 
Chinese and Indian production methods as late as the eighteenth century in order to 
develop their own iron and steel manufacturing techniques [4, 22]. The other great pillar 
of the British industrial revolution, cotton-manufacturing, might also have benefited from 
prior Eastern initiatives. Thus, while it is recognized that the British inventor, John 
Lombe, set up the silk machines that would later become the model for the Lancashire 
cotton machines and that he borrowed his idea from the Italian machines, nevertheless it 
turns out that the latter were a replica of the earlier Chinese inventions from the thirteenth 
century [18].  
All in all, though, none of this is to say that the British were merely passive 
benefactors of Indian and especially Chinese, inventions for they surely did much insofar 
as they put everything together, the outcome of which was the development of per capita 
income at levels that had previously not been witnessed before in world history. And for 
all the Chinese technological prowess it is clearly the British, not the Chinese, who 
managed to invent the steam engine. Overall, then, part of the skill of the British was the 
ability to be open to the inventions of others.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Returning to the key goals of this article, the upshot of the discussion is three-fold. First, 
it challenges the first-step of the Eurocentric big bang theory of modernity/globalization, 
which presumes that the West was entirely self-made. For this obscures the point that the 
West benefited from adapting earlier Eastern inventions. Second, the discussion suggests 
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that the rise of the West occurred in significant part during the early global age in which 
Orientalization was the dominant process and Occidentalization the subordinate one. The 
discussion RIWKHGLIIXVLRQRI(DVWHUQ³UHVRXUFHSRUWIROLRV´WKHUHIRUHSHUIRUPVDGXDO
intellectual task: first, that it problematizes the self-made status that Eurocentrism awards 
the Europeans (and simultaneously brings into play the role of various Eastern peoples); 
and second, that this diffusion constitutes a litmus test for the presence of early eastern-
led globalization after about 1492 insofar as it evoked an impact propensity whereby 
Europe was, at least in part, remade as a result of such global diffusions. 
 The third key point is that while Europe overtook China in the nineteenth century 
and indeed became the dominant region in the world, coupled after 1945 with the United 
States, such that China took a great leap backwards, nevertheless what we witness today 
is not so much the rise but the return of China to the centre of the global economy, where 
it had lain between c.1450 and c.0RUHRYHU&KLQD¶VOHDGLQJSRVLWLRQZDVODUJHO\
the result of the industrial developments that had occurred during the Sung period, which 
suggests that 960 rather than 1978 might more appropriately constitute the year-zero of 
&KLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQW 
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